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ABSTRACT 
Pork-Barrel Politics, Discriminatory Policies and Fiscal Federalism  
by Brian Roberson * 
This paper examines the role of discriminatory policy tools in a model of 
redistributive politics with jurisdictional specific projects. In equilibrium, the 
ability to tactically target both jurisdictional specific projects, with benefits 
concentrated within a given jurisdiction, and the costs associated with those 
projects across multiple jurisdictions, leads to inefficiency in the provision of the 
“local” projects. In particular, politically motivated discrimination in the provision 
of local projects and/or their associated costs results in the foregoing of efficient 
projects. However, greater discriminatory ability in the set of available policies 
lowers the level of inefficiency in the provision of the local projects. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, redistributive politics, distributive politics, Colonel Blotto 
  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Kuhhandel in der Lokalpolitik und der fiskalische Föderalismus  
Dieser Aufsatz untersucht in einem Modell umverteilender Politik die Rolle von 
lokalen öffentlichen Gütern und öffentlichen Projekten in einzelnen Juris-
diktionen. Politiker können aus strategischen Gründen bestimmte lokale 
Projekte durchführen und dadurch gezielt bestimmte Gebietskörperschaften 
beeinflussen, welche die Vorteile dieser Projekte genießen, während die damit 
verbundenen Kosten von mehreren Jurisdiktionen getragen werden. Dies führt 
zu einer Ineffizienz in der Durchführung solcher lokalen Projekte. Insbesondere 
führt eine politisch motivierte Ungleichbehandlung verschiedener Gebiets-
körperschaften bei der Durchführung lokaler Projekte bzw. ihrer Finanzierung 
dazu, dass manche effizienten Projekte nicht durchgeführt werden. Allerdings 
geht diese Ineffizienz zurück, wenn es größere Möglichkeiten zu ungleicher 
Behandlungen verschiedener Jurisdiktionen gibt. 
                                                 
*  I am grateful to Dan Kovenock and James C. Moore for very helpful comments. An earlier version of 
this paper was presented in a seminar at Indiana University, and at the annual meetings for the 
Midwest Political Science Association. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support and hospitality 
of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.  
 
 
1 Introduction
Economic fiscal federalism examines the economic efficiency of the allocation of resources by
a central government and by local governments. Traditionally (i.e. the literature following
Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972)) it is held that inefficiency is the result of the failure of
local governments to internalize the interjurisdictional externalities from their local projects,
the failure of local governments to coordinate local project production and utilize economies
of scale, the uniformity of the central government’s policy over a population with heteroge-
neous preferences for local projects, or asymmetries in the information available to different
levels of government (henceforth the traditional sources of inefficiency). Notably absent from
this list is one of the more commonly identified sources of the governmental misallocation of
resources, namely pork-barrel politics. This paper examines the strategic political targeting
of jurisdictional specific projects (or equivalently local public goods) and/or their associated
costs, at both the central and local levels, and the nature of the resulting inefficiencies. Po-
litical parties face a tradeoff between efficiency and discriminatory ability, and in equilibrium
the presence of discriminatory policy tools results in inefficiency in the provision of the local
projects. However, as the set of available policies allows for greater discriminatory ability
the level of inefficiency in the provision of the local projects decreases.1 That is, greater
discriminatory ability increases the costs of forgoing efficient local projects. Thus, this pa-
per highlights an important and purely strategic role for discriminatory policy instruments
such as interjurisdictional transfers that provides a contrast with the view that such policy
instruments are solely a tool for fiscal equalization (i.e. the literature following Buchanan
(1950)).
The model of redistributive politics examines the strategic allocation of a budget across
voters. Each voter votes for the party offering the highest level of utility, and each party’s
payoff is equal to their vote share. Several variations of the model (Cox and McCubbins
(1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996), Myerson (1993),
and Laslier and Picard (2002)) have served as fundamental tools in the analysis of electoral
1This result holds for all parameter configurations in which the local projects are efficient but not un-
reasonably so. In particular, the result holds for all parameter configurations in which the local projects
are efficient at all levels up to 1.5 times more efficient than direct transfers. Once the local projects are
excessively efficient uniform provision of local projects leads to greater efficiency.
3
competition. Closely related to this paper2 is Lizzeri and Perisco’s (2001, henceforth L-P)
model of redistributive competition (over a continuum of voters) with public good provision.
In L-P political parties compete for vote share by announcing binding commitments as to
how they will allocate a budget across voters and to investment in the production of a
(global) public good. This paper extends the model of redistributive politics with a finite
population of voters to allow for redistributive competition with local projects and examines
the cases of: complete uniformity in both local project provision and the assignment of the
associated costs, complete discriminatory ability in local project provision and net transfers,
discriminatory net transfers with uniform local project provision, and discriminatory local
project provision with uniform net transfers.3
Oates’ Decentralization Theorem states that, absent interjurisdictional externalities and
economies of scale in the production of local projects, decentralization yields a level of welfare
that is at least as high as that of centralization. In this context, a decentralized system is one
in which each jurisdiction independently makes its own local project provision decision and
raises it own taxes, and a centralized system is one in which the central government makes
the local project provision decision (often uniformly in this literature) for each jurisdiction
and raises taxes to cover the associated costs. Conversely, this paper shows that once the
incentives of discriminatory policy tools are taken into account Oates’ Decentralization theo-
rem fails to hold. That is, in the absence of the traditional sources of inefficiency, the greater
discriminatory ability of a centralized system may result in a higher level of welfare than a
decentralized system. Closely related to Oates’ Decentralization Theorem is the strand of
literature on the unification and break up of nations (see for example Alesina and Spolaore
(1997, 2003), Bolton, Roland, and Spolaore (1996), Bolton and Roland (1997), and Rutta
(2005)) which focuses on the traditional tradeoff between the gains of centralization and the
costs of centralization, i.e. economies of scale and the internalization of externalities versus
the uniformity of the central government’s policy over a population with heterogeneous pref-
erences for local projects. In contrast, this paper highlights that the greater discriminatory
ability of the centralized government may provide an additional incentive for unification.
Also related is the model of distributive politics (see for example Riker (1962), Buchanan
2Also related is Dixit and Londregan (1998) who examine a multi-period multi-tiered model of federalism.
3The case of decentralized redistributive competition with individual transfer discrimination examined in
this paper is the generalization of Theorem 3 in L-P to a finite population of voters.
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and Tullock (1962), Weingast (1979), Shepsle and Weingast (1981), or Ferejohn, Fiorina, and
McKelvey (1987)) which examines the centralized provision of jurisdictional specific projects
with uniform cost sharing across all jurisdictions. The provision of the local projects is de-
termined by a legislature comprised of representatives from each of the jurisdictions. Most
closely related to this paper is Lockwood (2002).4 Among the extensions that Lockwood
(2002) makes, that paper allows for the centralized government to choose a uniform level of
taxation within each jurisdiction rather than a uniform level of taxation across all jurisdic-
tions. While this paper does not focus on a rigorous modeling of the legislature,5 it may be
viewed as complementary to the distributive politics literature in focus. However, this paper
allows for not only the non-uniformity of the central government’s provision of local project
provision across jurisdictions, but also the non-uniformity of the central government’s net
transfers both across and within jurisdictions and the non-uniformity of the local govern-
ment’s net transfers across voters within the jurisdiction. In a sense this analysis levels the
playing field between centralization and decentralization in that decentralization is not a
priori efficient in the absence of the traditional sources of inefficiency.
Lastly, this paper is of theoretical interest to the literature on the Colonel Blotto game
(Borel (1921), Tukey (1949), Gross and Wagner (1950), Blackett (1954, 1958), Bellman
(1969) and more recently Kvasov (2005), Weinstein (2005), Golman and Page (2006), and
Roberson (2006)). In particular, the model of redistributive politics with discriminatory
local project provision and discriminatory net transfers is equivalent to a Colonel Blotto
game in which each player has multiple military technologies each with different levels of
discriminatory ability across the various battlefields. This paper’s results on the tradeoffs
between discriminatory ability and efficiency apply directly in this context.
Section 2 presents the model of redistributive politics with local project provision. Section
3 characterizes the set of Nash equilibrium univariate marginal distributions of the games of
redistributive politics with local projects; demonstrates the existence of a joint distribution
with the appropriate equilibrium univariate marginal distributions and with the property
that the budget is satisfied with probability one; and explores the efficiency and distributional
4See also Besley and Coate (2003) and Grossman and Helpman (2005) who examine related models.
5As is common in models of electoral competition (see for example Myerson (1993) or Grossman and
Helpman (1996)), the policy implemented by the legislature may be assumed to be a probabilistic compromise
of the parties’ equilibrium local project and cost allocation policies.
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properties of equilibrium under the different regimes. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Voters
The model extends Laslier and Picard’s (2002) two-party model of redistributive politics
by including local projects and by examining how the various discriminatory tools available
to the political parties affect the resulting electoral competition. The electorate consists
of a finite and even number n of voters, which are denoted by z ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The set of
voters is partitioned into a finite number k ≥ 2 of disjoint jurisdictions, where jurisdiction
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} consists of a finite number mj ≥ 2 of voters with
∑k
j=1mj = n. Voters are
distinguished by the jurisdiction to which they belong, where voter z in jurisdiction j is
denoted by z (j). Let Nj denote the set of voters in jurisdiction j. Each voter is endowed
with 1 unit of a private homogeneous good.
While the results of this paper apply more generally, in order to simplify the statement
and proofs of the results we will focus on the symmetric case in which for all jurisdictions
j,−j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, m ≡ mj = m−j, m is even, k is even, and each local project provides a
common benefit of G to each voter within the jurisdiction to which it is provided. In each
jurisdiction the production of the local project is a zero-one decision which is denoted by
ι
j
i ∈ {0, 1} for party i in jurisdiction j. The production of the local project in jurisdiction j
requires p ≤ m units of the homogeneous good. Thus, local project provision is efficient if
G > p
m
.
Each voter in each jurisdiction receives an offer of a tax or transfer from each party. For
voter z in jurisdiction j, let t
z(j)
i ∈ R+ denote the amount of the private homogeneous good
available for consumption by the voter after party i’s commitment to any tax or transfer to
that voter. We assume that voters’ utilities are additively separable in the private homoge-
neous good and the local project. Thus, the utility that voter z in district j receives from
party i who offers them
(
ι
j
i , t
z(j)
i
)
is
uz(j)
(
ι
j
i , t
z(j)
i
)
= t
z(j)
i + ι
j
iG.
Each citizen votes for the party that provides them with the higher level of utility. In the
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case that the parties provide the same level of utility to a voter, the parties win the voter
with equal probability.
Political Competition
Two parties, A and B, make simultaneous offers of transfers to each of the n voters and
production commitments for the local projects in each of the k jurisdictions. Each party’s
payoff is its vote share. The maximum tax that can be imposed upon a voter is equal
to one unit of the private homogeneous good. Thus, each voter’s allocation of the private
homogeneous good, after any taxes or transfers, is nonnegative.
As in the model of redistributive politics (Laslier and Picard (2002)), there are no pure
strategy equilibria in the game of redistributive politics with discriminatory local projects
and/or transfers. A mixed strategy for party i in the game with discriminatory local
project provision and transfers which are discriminatory both across and within each ju-
risdiction, which we call a redistributive-lp schedule, is an n+ k-variate distribution function
Pi : {0, 1}
k⋃
R
n
+ → [0, 1]. The vector of party i’s net transfers to the n voters and the k local
project choices is a random n + k-tuple drawn from Pi with the set of univariate marginal
distributions
{
L
j
i ,
{
F
z(j)
i
}
z∈Nj
}k
j=1
. Since the production decision for each local project is
zero-one, the k univariate marginal distribution functions,
{
L
j
i
}k
j=1
, one univariate marginal
distribution function for each district j, are each Bernoulli distributions. The probability
that party i provides the local project in district j, E
L
j
i
(x), is denoted by αji . The remaining
n univariate marginal distribution functions,
{
F
z(j)
i
}n
z=1
, one univariate marginal distribu-
tion function for each voter z, are the univariate marginal distributions of the allocations
that result from party i’s net transfers to each voter z.
Each party’s redistributive-lp schedule must satisfy the aggregate budget constraint. The
set of budget balancing completely discriminatory redistributive-lp schedules is denoted by,
B =
{{{
ιj
}k
j=1
,
{
tz(j)
}n
z=1
}
|
k∑
j=1
ιjp+
n∑
z=1
tz(j) ≤ n
}
.
The support of any feasible redistributive-lp schedule is contained in B.
The two types of discriminatory ability, transfer and local project, result in four dif-
ferent types of discriminatory abilities: complete uniformity in transfers (both across and
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within jurisdictions) and local projects; complete discriminatory ability in transfers and lo-
cal projects; uniform local project provision with discriminatory transfers, uniform transfers
with discriminatory local projects.
2.1 Complete Uniformity
There are only two possible budget-balancing pure strategies for each party i in the game
under uniform project provision and uniform taxation (henceforth complete uniformity) ei-
ther uniformly produce the local projects in each of the jurisdictions and spread the costs
uniformly across all jurisdictions (ιji = 1 for all j and t
z
i = 1 −
p
m
for all z) or do nothing
(ιji = 0 for all j and t
z
i = 1 for all z).
The game of complete uniformity, which we label
CU {G, p,m, n} ,
is the one-shot game in which parties attempt to maximize their vote shares by simultane-
ously announcing completely uniform policies, under the assumption that each voter votes
for the party that provides the higher utility (with ties broken by fair randomization).
2.2 Discriminatory Local Project Provision and Transfers
We now examine the opposite extreme in which neither the provision of the local projects
nor the individual transfers are required to be uniform.
The game of completely discriminatory redistributive politics with local projects, which
we label
CD {G, p,m, n} ,
is the one-shot game in which parties attempt to maximize their vote shares by simulta-
neously announcing aggregate budget balancing completely discriminatory redistributive-lp
schedules, under the assumption that each voter votes for the party that provides the higher
utility (with ties broken by fair randomization).
2.3 Uniform Project Provision and Discriminatory Transfers
As in the case of completely discriminatory redistributive politics with local projects, there
are no pure strategy equilibria in the game of redistributive politics with uniform local
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projects and discriminatory transfers. However, since local project provision is uniform,
the k univariate marginal distributions
{
L
j
i
}k
j=1
can be represented by a single univariate
marginal distribution function, {Li}. The probability that party i provides the local project,
ELi (x), is denoted by αi.
The game of transfer discriminating redistributive politics with local projects, which we
label
TD {G, p,m, n} ,
is the one-shot game in which parties attempt to maximize their vote share by simultaneously
announcing budget balancing transfer discriminating redistributive-lp schedules, under the
assumption that each voter votes for the party that provides the higher utility (with ties
broken by fair randomization).
2.4 Discriminatory Project Provision and Uniform Transfers
Similar to the two previous cases, unless local projects are sufficiently inefficient, there are
no pure strategy equilibrium in the game of redistributive politics with discriminatory lo-
cal projects and uniform transfers. However, since transfers are uniform, the n univariate
marginal distributions
{
F
z(j)
i
}n
z=1
can be represented by a single univariate marginal distri-
bution function, {Fi}.
The game of local project discriminating redistributive politics with local projects, which
we label
LPD {G, p,m, n} ,
is the one-shot game in which parties attempt to maximize their vote share by simultaneously
announcing budget balancing local project discriminating redistributive-lp schedules, under
the assumption that each voter votes for the party that provides the higher utility (with ties
broken by fair randomization).
3 Results
We begin with the most basic case of complete uniformity in both the provision of local
projects and their associated costs. While this is a trivial case, it provides a point of com-
parison with more discriminatory policy spaces.
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Proposition 1: In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game CU {G, p,m, n}
each party must employ a strategy that uniformly produces the local projects
with the necessary revenue raised through uniform taxation (ιji = 1 for all j and
tzi = 1 −
p
m
for all z) if G ≥ p
m
and does nothing (ιji = 0 for all j and t
z
i = 1 for
all z) otherwise.
It is important to note that, in the absence of the traditional sources of inefficiency complete
uniformity (or equivalently the absence of discriminatory policy tools) results in efficient
provision of the local projects.
3.1 Optimal Univariate Marginal Distributions
Theorem 1 provides a set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions for the completely
discriminating game, and section 3.2 establishes the existence of n+ k-variate distributions
that generate the required set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions and allocate
the aggregate budget with probability one.6 To avoid integer issues we will focus on the case
that pk
2m
∈
{
0, 1, 2, . . . , k
2
}
.7 In the case that pk
2m
is not an integer, a similar result holds by
replacing each p in Theorem 1 with 2m
k
⌈
pk
2m
⌉
, where the ceiling function, ⌈x⌉, provides the
smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
3.1.1 Equilibrium in a Completely Discriminating System
Theorem 1: A Nash equilibrium of the game CD {G, p,m, n} is for each party to
employ a mixed strategy that produces the local projects and offers net transfers
according to the following univariate marginal distribution functions:
6Given the connection between the model of redistributive politics with local projects and the Colonel
Blotto game it is conjectured that the result on the uniqueness of the univariate marginal distributions in
the Colonel Blotto game (Roberson (2006)) can be extended to cover this game. However, the extension of
this result to the case of redistributive politics with local projects is nontrivial.
7Note that the support of any optimal completely discriminating redistributive-lp schedule, P , is contained
in the boundary of B, and thus,
∑n
z=1 t
z(j) = n−
∑k
j=1 ι
jp with probability one. Recall that EP
(∑k
j=1 ι
j
)
=∑k
j=1 α
j . It follows directly that in any strategy in which
∑k
j=1 α
j is not an integer
∑k
j=1 ι
j must take on
at least two different integer values with positive probability. It is then straightforward to establish that
any strategy in which
∑k
j=1 α
j is not an integer is strictly dominated by a strategy in which
∑k
j=1 α
j is an
integer.
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1. If G ≥ p
m
, then for each party i and jurisdiction j
∀ z ∈ Nj F
z(j)
i
(
x|ιji = 0
)
= xm
p
x ∈
[
0, p
m
]
F
z(j)
i
(
x|ιji = 1
)
= x
2− p
m
x ∈
[
0, 2− p
m
]
L
j
i (y) =
{
p
2m
y = 0
1 y = 1
2. If G < p
m
, then for each party i and jurisdiction j
∀ z ∈ Nj F
z(j)
i
(
x|ιji = 0
)
= x
2
x ∈ [0, 2]
L
j
i (y) =
{
1 y = 0
1 y = 1
In each case, the expected payoff for each party is 1
2
of the vote share.
Proof: We begin by showing that in case 1, G ≥ p
m
, these univariate marginal
distributions are part of an equilibrium joint distribution. First, in any optimal
strategy the budget is expended with probability one and thus in expectation.
Assuming that there exists a sufficient n+ k-variate distribution (which is estab-
lished in section 3.2), the univariate marginals given for case 1, G ≥ p
m
, are part
of a feasible joint distribution since:∑k
j=1 α
j
ip+
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αji
)
E
F
z(j)
i |ι
j
i=0
(
x
z(j)
i
)
+
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
α
j
iEF z(j)i |ι
j
i=1
(
x
z(j)
i
)
= n
(1)
The following proof is for case 1, G ≥ p
m
. Case 2, G < p
m
, follows directly. Party
A’s expected payoff from an arbitrary strategy, P¯A, in which party A’s transfers
are contained in the support of party B’s transfers and with the set of univariate
marginal distributions
{
L¯
j
A,
{
F¯
z(j)
A
}
z∈Nj
}k
j=1
is:
1
2n
∑k
j=1 α
j
Ap+
1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
) ∫ p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 0
)
+ 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
α
j
A
∫ 2− p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 1
)
But from the expectation of the budget constraint, equation (1), it follows that
1
2n
∑k
j=1 α
j
Ap+
1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
) ∫ p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 0
)
+ 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
α
j
A
∫ 2− p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 1
)
≤ 1
2
(2)
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which holds with equality if and only if party A uses a completely discriminatory
redistributive-lp schedule that expends the entire budget in expectation, as does
the equilibrium strategy. Thus party A’s vote share cannot be increased by
deviating to another strategy in which party A’s transfers are contained in the
support of party B’s transfers.
Furthermore if party B is following the equilibrium strategy, then party A cannot
increase its voteshare by providing transfers outside the support of party B’s
transfers. Let s¯ji |ι
j
i be the upper bound of candidate i’s distribution of transfers
for district j conditional on the public project provision. Clearly, it is never a
best response for s¯
z(j)
A |ι
j
A = 1 > s¯
z(j)
B |ι
j
A = 1. By way of contradiction suppose
that there exists at least one z (j) such that s¯
z(j)
A |ι
j
A = 0 > s¯
z(j)
B |ι
j
A = 0 where
s¯
z(j)
B |ι
j
A = 0 ≤ G. If s¯
z(j)
A |ι
j
A = 0 ≤ G for all z, then the result follows directly
from the arguments given above. The remaining case is that for each z in which
s¯
z(j)
A |ι
j
A = 0 > s¯
z(j)
B |ι
j
A = 0 it is also the case that s¯
z(j)
A |ι
j
A = 0 > G. Let Z¯ denote
the set of z (j) for which s¯
z(j)
A |ι
j
A = 0 > G. The expected vote share for party A
from an arbitrary strategy P¯A, in which party A’s transfers are contained in the
support of party B’s transfers except for the set z ∈ Z¯ is:
1
2n
∑k
j=1 α
j
Ap+
1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
) ∫ p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 0
)
+ 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
)
p
m
(
1− F¯
z(j)
A
(
p
m
|ιjA = 0
))
+ 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
) ∫ s¯z(j)
A
|ιj
A
=0
G
(x−G) dF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 0
)
+ 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
α
j
A
∫ 2− p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 1
)
From the expectation of the budget constraint, equation (1), it follows that
1
2n
∑k
j=1 α
j
Ap+
1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
α
j
A
∫ 2− p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 1
)
+ 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
) [∫ p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 0
)
+
∫ s¯z(j)
A
|ιj
A
=0
G
xdF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 0
)]
+ 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
) [
p
m
(
1− F¯
z(j)
A
(
p
m
|ιjA = 0
))
−G
(
1− F¯
z(j)
A
(
G|ιjA = 0
))]
≤ 1
2
− 1
2n
∑k
j=1
∑
z∈Nj
(
1− αjA
) ∫ G
p
m
(
x− p
m
)
dF¯
z(j)
A
(
x|ιjA = 0
)
Thus, given that party B is following the equilibrium strategy, party A cannot
increase its voteshare by providing transfers outside the support of party B’s
transfers. The argument for player B is symmetric.
Q.E.D.
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Remarkably, a modified form of Theorem 1 applies in the case that transfers are re-
quired to be uniform within each jurisdiction but are allowed to be discriminatory across
jurisdictions (i.e. for each voter z and jurisdiction j, tz(j) = tj). Thus, the presence of
interjurisdictional transfers, or equivalently the ability to discriminate transfers across ju-
risdictions, is sufficient to generate the sort of equilibrium discriminatory policies given in
Theorem 1. This result, stated in Corollary 1 below, follows immediately from the proof of
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: In the modified form of the game CD {G, p,m, n} in which trans-
fers are uniform within each jurisdiction but are allowed to be non-uniform across
jurisdictions, a Nash equilibrium is for each party to employ a mixed strategy
that produces the local projects and offers net transfers according to the following
univariate marginal distribution functions:
1. If G ≥ p
m
, then for each party i and jurisdiction j
∀ z ∈ Nj F
j
i
(
x|ιji = 0
)
= xm
p
x ∈
[
0, p
m
]
F
j
i
(
x|ιji = 1
)
= x
2− p
m
x ∈
[
0, 2− p
m
]
L
j
i (y) =
{
p
2m
y = 0
1 y = 1
2. If G < p
m
, then for each party i and jurisdiction j
∀ z ∈ Nj F
j
i
(
x|ιji = 0
)
= x
2
x ∈ [0, 2]
L
j
i (y) =
{
1 y = 0
1 y = 1
In each case, the expected payoff for each party is 1
2
of the vote share.
3.1.2 Equilibrium in a Transfer Discriminating System
The following Theorem provides a set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions for the
game of transfer discriminating redistributive politics with local projects. This result extends
Lizzeri and Persico’s (1998, 2001) model of redistributive politics with project provision to
allow for a finite population of voters. In L-P, as in Myerson (1993), each party’s strategy
space for net transfers is a single univariate distribution function over R+, where the measure
13
over each interval is interpreted as the fraction of voters for whom a party’s transfers have
value in that interval. Conversely in this paper, as in Laslier and Picard (2002), each party’s
strategy space for net transfers is an n-variate distribution function over Rn+ where the
set of n univariate marginal distributions is interpreted as the randomization in transfers
individually targeted at each of the n voters. Section 3.2 establishes the existence of n+ 1-
variate distributions for each jurisdiction j that generate the required set of equilibrium
univariate marginal distributions and allocate the jurisdiction’s budget with probability one.
Theorem 2: A Nash equilibrium of the game TD {G, p,m, n} is for each party to
employ a mixed strategy which produces the local project and offers net transfers
according to the following univariate distribution functions:
1. If p
m
≤ G ≤ 2p
m
, then for party i
Li (y) =
{
2p
m
−G y = 0
1 y = 1
∀ z
F
z(j)
i (x|ιi = 0) =


1
2
(
x
2p
m
−G
)
0 ≤ x < 2p
m
−G
1
2
2p
m
−G ≤ x < G+ 2− 2p
m
1
2
(
1 +
x−G−2+ 2p
m
2p
m
−G
)
G+ 2− 2p
m
≤ x < 2
1 x ≥ 2
and
F
z(j)
i (x|ιi = 1) =
x
2− 2p
m
x ∈
[
0, 2− 2p
m
]
2. If G > 2p
m
, then both parties provide the local project with certainty, where
F
z(j)
i (x|ιi = 1) is given above.
3. If G < p
m
, then with certainty, neither party provides the local project and
∀ z
F
z(j)
i (x|ιi = 0) =
x
2
x ∈ [0, 2]
In all cases, the expected payoff for each party is 1
2
of the vote share.
14
Proof: We begin by showing that in case 1, p
m
≤ G ≤ 2p
m
, these univariate
marginals are part of an equilibrium joint distribution. First, in any optimal
strategy the budget is expended with probability one and thus in expectation.
Assuming that there exists a sufficient n-variate distribution (which is established
in section 3.2), the univariate marginals specified for case 1, p
m
≤ G ≤ 2p
m
, are
part of a feasible joint distribution since:
kp+
∑n
z=1EF z(j)i |ιi=1
(
x
z(j)
i
)
= n
and
∑n
z=1EF z(j)i |ιi=0
(
x
z(j)
i
)
= n
(3)
The following proof is for case 1, p
m
≤ G ≤ 2p
m
. Cases 2 and 3, G > 2p
m
and G < p
m
respectively, follow directly. Given that party B is following the equilibrium
strategy, it is never a best response for party A to provide transfers outside the
support of party B’s transfers. Thus, party A’s expected payoff from an arbitrary
strategy H¯A, with the set of univariate marginal distributions
{
L¯i,
{
F¯
z(j)
i
}n
z=1
}
,
is
αA
(
1 +G− 2p
m
)
1
n
∑n
z=1
∫ 2− 2p
m
0
x
2− 2p
m
dF¯
z(j)
A (x|ιA = 1)
+αA
(
2p
m
−G
)
1
2
+(1− αA)
(
1 +G− 2p
m
)
1
m
∑n
z=1
[
1− F¯
z(j)
A
(
G+ 2− 2p
m
|ιA = 0
)]
+(1− αA)
(
2p
m
−G
)
1
m
∑n
z=1
∫ 2
0
F
z(j)
B (x|ιB = 0) dF¯
z(j)
A (x|ιA = 0)
Simplifying, party A’s expected payoff is
αA
(
1 +G− 2p
m
)
1
2(m−p)
∑n
z=1
∫ 2− 2p
m
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A (x|ιA = 1)
+αA
(
2p
m
−G
)
1
2
+(1− αA)
1
2n
∑n
z=1
∫ 2p
m
−G
0
xdF¯
z(j)
A (x|ιB = 0)
+ (1− αA)
1
2n
∑n
z=1
∫ 2
G+2− 2p
m
xdF¯
z(j)
A (x|ιB = 0)
But from the expectation of the budget constraint, equation (3), it follows that
player A’s expected payoff is less than or equal to 1
2
and holds with equality if
and only if party A uses a transfer discriminating redistributive-lp schedule that
does not provide transfers outside the support of the equilibrium strategy and
expends the entire budget in expectation, as does the equilibrium strategy. Thus
party A’s vote share cannot be increased by deviating to another strategy. The
argument for party B is symmetric.
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Q.E.D.
As was the case with both discriminatory projects and transfers, a modified form of The-
orem 2 applies in the case that transfers are required to be uniform within each jurisdiction
but are allowed to be discriminatory across jurisdictions (i.e. for each voter z and jurisdiction
j, tz(j) = tj). Thus, the presence of interjurisdictional transfers, or equivalently the ability
to discriminate transfers across jurisdictions, is sufficient to generate the sort of equilibrium
policies given in Theorem 2, and this result, stated in Corollary 2 below, follows immediately
from the proof of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2: In the modified form of the game TD {G, p,m, n} in which trans-
fers are uniform within each jurisdiction but are allowed to be non-uniform across
jurisdictions, a Nash equilibrium is for each party to employ a mixed strategy
which produces the local project and offers net transfers according to the follow-
ing univariate distribution functions:
1. If p
m
≤ G ≤ 2p
m
, then for party i
Li (y) =
{
2p
m
−G y = 0
1 y = 1
for each j and ∀ z ∈ Nj
F
j
i (x|ιi = 0) =


1
2
(
x
2p
m
−G
)
0 ≤ x < 2p
m
−G
1
2
2p
m
−G ≤ x < G+ 2− 2p
m
1
2
(
1 +
x−G−2+ 2p
m
2p
m
−G
)
G+ 2− 2p
m
≤ x < 2
1 x ≥ 2
and
F
j
i (x|ιi = 1) =
x
2− 2p
m
x ∈
[
0, 2− 2p
m
]
2. If G > 2p
m
, then both parties provide the local project with certainty, where
F
j
i (x|ιi = 1) is given above.
3. If G < p
m
, then with certainty, neither party provides the local project and
for each j and ∀ z ∈ Nj
F
j
i (x|ιi = 0) =
x
2
x ∈ [0, 2]
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In all cases, the expected payoff for each party is 1
2
of the vote share.
3.1.3 Equilibrium in a Local Project Discriminating System
The following Theorem provides the characterization of equilibrium joint distributions for
the game of local project discriminating redistributive politics with local projects.
Theorem 3: In all Nash equilibria of the game LPD {G, p,m, n} each party
employs a mixed strategy which produces the local project and offers net trans-
fers according to the following characterization of the joint distribution function:
If G > p
m
, then for party i
Li (y) =
{
1
2
y = 0
1 y = 1
Fi
(
x|
k∑
j=1
ι
j
i
)
=

 0 0 ≤ x < 1−
p kj=1 ι
j
i
n
1 x ≥ 1−
p kj=1 ι
j
i
n
and letting the distribution of
∑k
j=1 ι
j
i by denoted by Gi
Gi (z) =


0 z < 0
δ0 z = 0
δ0 + δ1 z = 1
...
...∑φ
j=0 δj z = φ
...
...
1 z ≥ k − 1
where δj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} and
∑k
j=0 δj = 1. The exact value of each
δj depends critically on the number of jurisdictions, k, and is summarized in the
Appendix.
The expected payoff for each party is 1
2
of the vote share.
The proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix.
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3.2 Existence of Equilibrium Joint Distributions
Subject to the constraint that there exist joint distribution functions that expend the re-
spective budgets with probability one and that provide the respective sets of equilibrium
univariate marginal distributions, Theorems 1 and 2 provide sets of equilibrium univariate
marginal distributions in the games of completely discriminating and transfer discriminating
redistributive politics with local projects. The following two subsections establish the exis-
tence of sufficient joint distributions in case 1 of Theorem 1, G ≥ p
m
, and case 1 of Theorem
2, p
m
≤ G ≤ 2p
m
. The remaining cases follow directly.8
3.2.1 Completely Discriminating System
We begin with the k-variate marginal distribution function of Pi, the completely discrimi-
nating redistributive-lp schedule, with the set of univariate marginal distribution functions{
L
j
i
}k
j=1
. This k-variate marginal distribution specifies the provision of the local projects
across the k jurisdictions. Given that pk
2m
∈
{
0, 1, 2, . . . , k
2
}
, it is clear that there are kC pk
2m
partitions of the k jurisdictions into a disjoint pk
2m
-subset and k − pk
2m
-subset. A sufficient k-
variate marginal distribution function for Pi is formed by the k-variate distribution function
which places equal probability on each of these partitions and provides the local project in
each jurisdiction contained in the k − pk
2m
-subset.
To determine an n-variate marginal distribution function of Pi, which specifies the net
transfers across the n voters generating the set of univariate marginal distribution func-
tions
{
F
z(j)
i
}n
z=1
, note that in any realization of the k production decisions in the k-variate
marginal distribution described above
∑k
j=1 ι
j
i = k −
pk
2m
with probability one. Given that
m is even, in each of the k − pk
2m
jurisdictions in which the local projects are produced the
voters may be partitioned into km
2
− pk
4
disjoint subsets with 2 voters each. In each subset
of 2 voters, z and z′ in jurisdiction j, suppose that each party independently applies the
8In the modified form of the game CD {G, p,m, n} in which transfers are uniform within each jurisdiction
but are allowed to be non-uniform across jurisdictions (as in Corollary 1), a similar result applies. However,
this case requires a slightly more complicated construction that follows along the lines of Roberson (2006).
In the modified form of the game TD {G, p,m, n} in which transfers are uniform within each jurisdiction but
are allowed to be non-uniform across jurisdictions (as in Corollary 2), the result follows directly.
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Fre´chet-Hoeffding lower bound 2-copula,9
W
(
F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 1
)
, F
z′(j)
i
(
x
z′(j)
i |ι
j
i = 1
))
=
max
{
F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 1
)
+ F
z′(j)
i
(
x
z′(j)
i |ι
j
i = 1
)
− 1, 0
}
,
where for each party i and voter z in jurisdiction j, F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 1
)
=
x
z(j)
i
2− p
m
for x
z(j)
i ∈[
0, 2− p
m
]
.10 Recalling that the support of a bivariate distribution function, H, is the com-
plement of the union of all open sets of R2 with H-volume zero, it follows directly that the
support of the bivariate distribution, formed by the 2-copula W and the univariate distribu-
tion F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 1
)
, is given by
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2+|x
1 + x2 = 2− p
m
}
. Thus, each of these
km
2
− pk
4
bivariate distributions generates transfers that sum to 2− p
m
.
Similarly, in each of the pk
2m
jurisdictions in which the local project is not produced the
voters may be partitioned into pk
4
disjoint subsets with 2 voters each. In each subset of 2
voters, z and z′ in jurisdiction j, suppose that each party independently applies the Fre´chet-
Hoeffding lower bound 2-copula,
W
(
F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 0
)
, F
z′(j)
i
(
x
z′(j)
i |ι
j
i = 0
))
=
max
{
F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 0
)
+ F
z′(j)
i
(
x
z′(j)
i |ι
j
i = 0
)
− 1, 0
}
,
where for each party i and voter z in jurisdiction j, F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 0
)
=
x
z(j)
i
p
m
for x
z(j)
i ∈[
0, p
m
]
. It follows directly that the support of the bivariate distribution, formed by the 2-
copula W and the univariate distribution F
z(j)
i
(
x
z(j)
i |ι
j
i = 0
)
, is given by{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2+|x
1 + x2 = p
m
}
. Thus, each of these pk
4
bivariate distributions generate trans-
fers that sum to p
m
. Given these pk
4
bivariate distributions, the km
2
− pk
4
bivariate distributions
described above, and that all n
2
of these bivariate distributions are independent, it is clear
that the support across all n voters is contained in
{
x ∈ Rn+|
∑n
i=1 x
i = n− pk + p
2k
2m
}
. Thus,
we have the following.
Proposition 2: Let P ∗i denote the n+ k-variate distribution function of party i
with support contained in
{{
ιj,
{
tz(j)
}
z∈Nj
}k
j=1
|
∑k
j=1
(
ιjp+
∑
z∈Nj
tz(j)
)
= n
}
induced by the construction outlined above. Then, P ∗i generates the equilibrium
9For an introduction to copulas see Nelsen (1999)
10See Kvasov (2005), who in a related problem discusses the issue of partitioning joint distributions into
independent sets of lower dimension.
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univariate marginal distributions in Theorem 1 and expends the aggregate bud-
get with probability one. (P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ), therefore, constitutes a Nash equilibrium of
the completely discriminating game of redistributive politics with local projects,
CD (G, p,m, n).
3.2.2 Transfer Discriminating System
Recall that, by assumption, n is even. Beginning with the case that the local project is
provided in each jurisdiction, there are n
2
disjoint subsets with 2 voters each. In each subset
of 2 voters, z and z′, suppose that each party independently applies the Fre´chet-Hoeffding
lower bound 2-copula,
W
(
F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 1) , F
z′
i
(
xz
′
i |ιi = 1
))
=
max
{
F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 1) + F
z′
i
(
xz
′
i |ιi = 1
)
− 1, 0
}
,
where for each party i and voter z, F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 1) =
xzi
2− 2p
m
for xzi ∈
[
0, 2− 2p
m
]
. It follows
directly that the support of the bivariate distribution, formed by the 2-copula W and the
univariate distribution F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 1), is given by
{(
xz, xz
′
)
∈ R2+|x
z + xz
′
= 2− 2p
m
}
. Given
that each of the n
2
bivariate distributions generate net transfers that sum to 2− 2p
m
, and that
these bivariate distributions are independent, the support across all n voters is contained in{
x ∈ Rn+|
∑n
z=1 x
z = n− pk
}
.
Similarly, in the case that the local project is not provided, in each subset of 2 voters,
z and z′, suppose that each party independently applies the Fre´chet-Hoeffding lower bound
2-copula,
W
(
F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 0) , F
z′
i
(
xz
′
i |ιi = 0
))
=
max
{
F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 0) + F
z′
i
(
xz
′
i |ιi = 0
)
− 1, 0
}
,
where for each party i and voter z,
F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 0) =


1
2
(
xzi
2p
m
−G
)
0 ≤ xzi <
2p
m
−G
1
2
2p
m
−G ≤ xzi < G+ 2−
2p
m
1
2
(
1 +
xzi −G−2+
2p
m
2p
m
−G
)
G+ 2− 2p
m
≤ xzi < 2
1 x ≥ 2
It follows directly that the support of the bivariate distribution, formed by the 2-copula W
and the univariate distribution F zi (x
z
i |ιi = 0), is contained in
{(
xz, xz
′
)
∈ R2+|x
z + xz
′
= 2
}
.
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Given that each of the n
2
bivariate distributions generate transfers that sum to 2, and that
these bivariate distributions are independent the support across all n voters is contained in{
x ∈ Rn+|
∑n
z=1 x
z = n
}
. Given this we have the following.
Proposition 3: Let H∗i denote the n + 1-variate distribution function of party
i with support contained in {{ι, {tz}nz=1} |ιp+
∑n
z=1 t
z = n} induced by the con-
struction outlined above. Then,H∗i generates the equilibrium univariate marginal
distributions in Theorem 2 and spends the aggregate budget with probability one.
Therefore, (H∗1 , H
∗
2 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the transfer discriminating
game of redistributive politics with local projects, TD (G, p,m, n).
3.3 Effects of Discriminatory Tools on Efficiency
We now apply the equilibrium characterizations of the systems with various discriminatory
abilities to compare the inefficiencies that arise in each. The primary criterion for comparing
the efficiency of these systems is the likelihood that each party commits to the production of
the local project in each jurisdiction when the provision of the local project is efficient. The
related criterion of ex-ante expected utility of each voter yields similar results. Corollary
3 compares the inefficiencies that arises under discriminatory local project provision and
net transfers to those which arise under discriminatory local project provision and uniform
transfers.
Corollary 3: Under discriminatory local project provision and net transfers the
probability that each party commits to the production of the local project in a
given jurisdiction when its provision is efficient is 1 − p
2m
. Under local project
discrimination and uniform net transfers the probability that each party commits
to the production of the local project when its provision is efficient is 1
2
. Thus,
the probability that each party commits to the production of the local project
when its provision is efficient is always higher in the more discriminatory system.
In all systems with discriminatory ability, the political parties face a tradeoff between the
efficiency of local projects and the pork-barrel incentive to “cultivate favored minorities.”
In the case that local project provision is discriminatory and net transfers are uniform, the
tactical targeting of local projects is the only available means of strategic discrimination.
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Moving from that system to one in which both local projects and net transfers are discrim-
inatory reduces the effectiveness of local project discrimination, or equivalently raises the
costs of forgoing efficient local projects. Thus, the greater discriminatory ability actually
increases the efficiency of local project provision.
Corollary 4 compares the inefficiencies that arises under discriminatory local project
provision and net transfers to those which arise under discriminatory net transfers and
uniform local project provision.
Corollary 4: Under discriminatory local project provision and net transfers
the probability that each party commits to the production of the local project
in a given jurisdiction when its provision is efficient is 1 − p
2m
. Under transfer
discrimination and uniform local project provision the probability that each party
commits to the production of the local project when its provision is efficient is
1+G− 2p
m
. Thus, the probability that each party commits to the production of the
local project when its provision is efficient is higher in the more discriminatory
system if p
m
< G < 3p
2m
and higher in the less discriminatory system if G > 3p
2m
.
In the case that net transfers are discriminatory and local project provision is uniform,
the tactical targeting of net transfers is the only available means of strategic discrimination.
Barring the case that local projects are excessively efficient, moving from that system to one
in which both local projects and net transfers are discriminatory also reduces the effectiveness
of local project discrimination, or equivalently raises the costs of forgoing efficient local
projects. Thus, the greater discriminatory ability actually increases the efficiency of local
project provision. However, once the benefits from the local projects are sufficiently large
(G > 3p
2m
), uniformity of local project provision leads to efficiency gains. This follows from
the fact that as the benefits provided by the local projects become sufficiently large, the
costs of not offering the efficient local projects become increasingly larger in the case of
uniform of local project provision. In the case in which both local projects and net transfers
are discriminatory, there is no corresponding change in the cost of forgoing efficient local
projects.
Together Corollaries 3 and 4 demonstrate that, barring excessively efficient local projects,
greater discriminatory ability actually increases the efficiency of local project provision by
weakening the incentives for pork-barrel politics. As noted in Proposition 1 the absence of the
22
traditional sources of inefficiency and any discriminatory ability results in complete efficiency
in the provision of local projects. Thus, discriminatory policy tools such as interjurisdictional
transfers create an incentive for pork-barrel politics that results in inefficiency, but greater
discriminatory ability actually weakens these incentives and results in gains in efficiency.
4 Conclusion
This paper extends Laslier and Picard’s (2002) model of redistributive politics with a finite
population of voters to allow for redistributive competition with local projects and shows
that the level of discriminatory ability is an important determinant in the efficiency of local
project provision. Remarkably, little has been done to examine the incentives for pork-
barrel politics in a fiscal federalism setting. This paper finds that, in such a setting, political
parties face a tradeoff between efficiency and discriminatory ability, and in equilibrium the
presence of discriminatory policy tools results in inefficiency in the provision of the local
projects. However, as the set of available policies allows for greater discriminatory ability
the level of inefficiency in the provision of the local projects decreases. That is, greater
discriminatory ability increases the costs of forgoing efficient local projects. Thus, this paper
highlights an important and purely strategic role for discriminatory policy instruments such
as interjurisdictional transfers that provides a stark contrast with the view that such policy
instruments are solely a tool for fiscal equalization.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 3. We begin by showing that if, G ≥ p
m
,
the univariate marginals given in Theorem 3 are part of an equilibrium joint distribution.
First, in any optimal strategy the budget is expended with probability one. The univariate
marginals specified are part of a feasible joint distribution since for each player i and each
random k + 1-tuple drawn from Ri:
p
k∑
j=1
ι
j
i +
n∑
i=1
[
1−
p
∑k
j=1 ι
j
i
n
]
= n.
Additionally, it is clear that there exist k + 1-variate distribution functions which provide
these univariate marginal distributions, the distribution for
∑k
j=1 ι
j
i , and that satisfy the
aggregate budget constraint with probability one.
Three important expressions that will notationally simplify the following analysis are
given below. These expressions represent the expected payoffs to party A from playing an
arbitrary pure strategy,
{{
ι¯
j
A
}k
j=1
, 1−
p kj=1 ι¯
j
A
n
}
, when party B is using a mixed strategy
in which there exists a β ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, such that for all j
L
j
B (y) =
{
1− β
k
y = 0
1 y = 1
and
GB (z) =
{
0 z ≤ β
1 z ≥ β
where GB denotes the distribution of
∑k
j=1 ι
j
B. Thus, the probability that each jurisdiction
j receives the local project from party B is β
k
and
∑k
j=1 ι
j
B = β with probability one.
Let α =
∑k
j=1 ι¯
j
A if α < β then 1 −
pα
n
> 1 − pβ
n
. Thus party A wins every jurisdiction
in which they provide the local project and all jurisdictions in which both parties do not
provide the local project, and party A loses every jurisdiction in which they do not provide
the local project and party B does (i.e. 1− pα
n
< G+1− pβ
n
since G ≥ p
m
). Thus the expected
payoff to player A when α < β is:
piA|α<β =
1
k2
[αβ + α (k − β) + (k − α) (k − β)] =
1
k2
[αβ + k (k − β)] (4)
Similarly if α > β then 1− pα
n
< 1− pβ
n
. Thus party A loses every jurisdiction in which they
do not provide the local project and all jurisdictions in which both parties do provide the
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local project, and party A wins every jurisdiction in which they do provide the local project
and party B does not (i.e. G+ 1− pα
n
> 1− pβ
n
since G ≥ p
m
). Thus the expected payoff to
player A when α > β is:
piA|α>β =
1
k2
[α (k − β)] (5)
Finally, if α = β then 1 − pα
n
= 1 − pβ
n
. Clearly party A ties in every jurisdiction in which
both parties provide the local project and all jurisdictions in both parties do not provide the
local project. Party A wins every jurisdiction in which they provide the local project and
party B does not, and party A loses in every jurisdiction in which they do not provide the
local project and party B does. Thus the expected payoff to player A when α = β is:
piA|α=β =
1
k2
[
1
2
αβ + α (k − β) +
1
2
(k − α) (k − β)
]
=
1
2
(6)
Suppose that there exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium G (G = GA = GB),
over α and β respectively,
G (z) =


0 z < 0
δ0 z = 0
δ0 + δ1 z = 1
...
...∑φ
j=0 δj z = φ
...
...
1 z ≥ k − 1
where δj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} and
∑k
j=0 δj = 1.
Given that party B is following such a strategy, party A’s expected payoff from an
arbitrary pure strategy
{{
ι¯
j
A
}k
j=1
, 1− pα
n
}
where α =
∑k
j=1 ι¯
j
A, is
piA|α =
∑
j<α
δjpiA|α>j + δα
1
2
+
∑
j>α
δjpiA|α<j.
Furthermore, the equilibrium payoffs must be attained over the support of the strategy.
Thus, for each i, pii|z =
1
2
for each z in the support of the symmetric equilibrium strategy. It
must also be the case that pii|z ≤
1
2
for each z not in the support of the symmetric equilibrium
strategy.
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Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which pii|z =
1
2
for all z,
∑k
j=0 δj
(
j
k
)
= 1
2
,
and δ0 = δk = 0. The remainder of the appendix establishes that there exists such an
equilibrium.11
Given that pii|z =
1
2
for all z, it follows that for all z < k, pii|z−pii|z+1 = 0 or equivalently
∑
j<z
δj
(
1−
j
k
)
+
∑
j>z+1
δj
(
j
k
)
= (δz + δz+1)
(
k
2
− (z + 1) +
z (z + 1)
k
)
.
Similarly, for all z > 0, pii|z−1 − pii|z = 0 or equivalently
∑
j<z−1
δj
(
1−
j
k
)
+
∑
j>z
δj
(
j
k
)
= (δz−1 + δz)
(
k
2
− z +
(z − 1) z
k
)
.
Recalling that
∑k
j=0 δj
(
j
k
)
= 1
2
and δ0 = δk = 0, for z = 0,
∑
j>1 δj
(
j
k
)
= (δ0 + δ1)
(
k
2
− 1
)
.
Solving for δ1 yields δ1 =
1
2( k2−1+
1
k)
. Similarly, for z = k,∑
j<k−1 δj
(
1− j
k
)
= (δk−1 + δk)
(
k
2
− k + (k−1)k
k
)
. Thus, δk−1 = δ1 =
1
2( k2−1+
1
k)
. A simi-
lar argument establishes that for for all j, δj = δk−j.
Given that δj = δk−j for all j and recalling that k is even, it follows that
k∑
j=0
δj
(
j
k
)
=
k
2
−1∑
j=0
δj
[
j
k
+
k − j
k
]
+ δ k
2
[
k
2
k
]
=
k
2
−1∑
j=0
δj +
1
2
δ k
2
=
1
2
k∑
j=0
δj =
1
2
.
Lastly, note that for k = 2, δ0 = δ2 = 0, δ1 =
1
2( 22−1+
1
2)
= 1, and, thus,
∑k
j=1 δj = 1 for
k = 2. A straightforward proof by induction establishes that
∑k
j=1 δj = 1 for all even k > 2.
11In the case of a continuum of jurisdictions, this equilibrium would be the solution to a first-order linear
differential equation with standard boundary conditions. Given that there are a finite number of jurisdictions,
the equilibrium is modified accordingly.
29
